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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
A  child  support  guideline  is  a  formula  used  to  calculate  support  payments  based  on  a  few  family  charac-
teristics.  Guidelines  began  replacing  court  awarded  support  payments  in the  late 1970s  and  early  1980s,
and were  eventually  mandated  by  the  federal  government  in  1988.  Two  fundamentally  different  types
of guidelines  are used:  percentage  of  obligor  income,  and  income  shares  models.  This  paper  explores  the
incentives  to  divorce  under  the two  schemes,  and  uses  the  NLSY  data  set  to  test  the  key predictions.  We
find that  percentage  of obligor  income  models  are destabilizing  for some  families  with  high  incomes.  This
may explain  why  several  states  have  converted  from  obligor  to  income  share  models,  and  it provides  a
subtle  lesson  for  the  no-fault  divorce  debate.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The introduction of no-fault divorce in the late 1960s and 1970s
led to a series of changes in family law that went well beyond the
removal of fault grounds. It is commonly accepted that under fault
based grounds for divorce, couples often colluded in the manu-
facture of the necessary ground and then perjured themselves in
court in order to divorce.1 Indeed, this was often argued as the
moral failure of the fault system, and at the time it was  considered
a major factor in necessitating reform. However, colluding over a
fabricated ground for divorce meant that the divorce was mutual
to some extent. A divorcing couple would agree to a division of
property, alimony, a child custody arrangement, and a child sup-
port settlement that was acceptable to both parties. Each divorce, in
effect, was a private agreement that took into account all of the par-
ticular circumstances within the marriage. No-fault divorce, when
it is fundamentally a change to unilateral divorce, eliminates the
mutual feature of fault laws and allowed for non-Pareto divorces.2
The issue of inefficient divorce became apparent immediately
after no-fault divorce was introduced.3 Early problems arose over
the division of property, and the classification of what actually
E-mail address: allen@sfu.ca (D.W. Allen).
1 See Jacob (1988, chap. 5) for a source of this understanding.
2 Of course, bargaining over divorce is not costless, and therefore, under fault laws
the reciprocal problem was  non-Pareto marriages. Almost all no-fault states are
unilateral divorce states. There are exceptions, however. Mississippi, for example, is
a  no-fault state, but since the irreconcilable difference must be agreed to, the divorce
is  mutual.
3 An inefficient divorce exists when the gains from one party leaving are lower
than  the losses caused by the divorce to the other party. It occurs when some type
of  transaction cost prevents Coasean bargaining.
constituted marital property. For example, US  common law
jurisdictions where “title” determined ownership of assets were
particularly troublesome.4 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as the
practice of alimony or spousal support was reduced, and as grounds
for divorce were made more unilateral through reduced separa-
tion periods and the removal of fault considerations from divorce
settlements, various lobby groups began to draw attention to the
problem of poverty among single-mother households — many of
which reached that status through divorce. When in dispute, child
custody and child support had historically been left to family courts
to decide on a case-by-case basis using the “needs of the child” and
“ability to pay” doctrine. This naturally led to different awards in
situations which appeared similar in terms of basic family charac-
teristics, but which may  have differed on margins unobservable to
third parties. Calls for more consistent child support awards were
made, and these calls were accelerated when it was  discovered that
single mothers made up a disproportionate share of families below
the poverty line, and that a large proportion of court awarded child
support payments were never paid. These efforts to reform child
support culminated in the creation of child support guidelines.5
4 As a result, property quickly became categorized as either marital (and subject
to  equitable or community division) or separate (and claimed by the title holder)
(Allen, 1990; Fineman, 1983). Most Canadian provinces also determined ownership
of  property within a marriage based on title, and this led to large wealth transfers
early on, until the property laws were changed (Allen, 1999).
5 Although this paper exploits differences in guideline formulas for support, the
term “guideline” generally refers to a whole body of legislation that mandates
enforcement, support amounts, penalties for non-performance, and other logistical
issues regarding support payments. The history of how support guideline legislation
came into being is, obviously, more complicated. See Beller and Graham (1993) for
the American details, or Allen (2011) for the Canadian history.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2012.04.001
310 D.W. Allen, M. Brinig / International Review of Law and Economics 32 (2012) 309– 316
In the United States, several states experimented in the late
1970s and early 1980s with child support guidelines, almost
always within the context of AFDC issues and matters of failure
by non-custodial fathers to pay.6 By 1988 every state was federally
mandated to have some type of child support guideline. Although
it took a few years for each state to comply, eventually the entire
country converted to guidelines. Some states simply extended to
all households, or adopted from other states, the earlier guide-
lines developed within welfare departments. Others started from
scratch and developed different types of guidelines. In either case,
the explicit guideline purpose was to reduce the discretion of the
family court, provide more consistent awards across jurisdictions,
generally increase the average award, and achieve some type of
equality of equivalence scales across households.7
There are many theoretical issues involved in the design of a
child support guideline. How are the costs of children to be calcu-
lated? How are they to be allocated across the divorced parents?
How is the utility of custody to be dealt with? And what specific fac-
tors will be used to determine the level of child support payments?
There are practical considerations as well which have to do with
measurement, enforcement, reporting, and incentives. Child sup-
port guidelines must balance along a knife’s edge. If payments are
too low, then children living in the custodial home may  be deprived
of a standard of living they had when the marriage was intact, or
may end up with a standard of living below a poverty line — thus
defeating the guideline objective. If payments are too high, then
the welfare of the non-custodial parent — who may  have a subse-
quent spouse and children — will suffer. Almost the entire academic
discussion among social scientists considering child support guide-
lines has centered on this issue of adequacy of support — and almost
exclusively on the issue of adequate custodial support. However,
guidelines can have a more subtle impact on divorce incentives, and
therefore, indirectly, have an impact on child outcomes. Child sup-
port guidelines, depending on how they are designed, may  create
strong incentives for one spouse in a marginal marriage to divorce
in order to capture a wealth transfer along with custody. This cre-
ates an ironic, if not sad, outcome. If a child support guideline is
designed to protect children, but in the process creates an incen-
tive to divorce, then the effect of the incentive is at odds with the
stated objective of the guideline since children are typically both
emotionally and financially disadvantaged by divorce. The truth
is, it is impossible to separate out the question of adequacy and
incentives.
This paper examines the broad incentives that are created under
different types of guideline schemes in the US, and then empirically
investigates them using the 1979 Youth cohort of the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey (NLSY). Currently, there are two major different
types of guidelines in the US. We  argue that one of them is flawed
in terms of its divorce incentives. Our empirical work supports this
claim.8
2. Relevant details of US child support guidelines
As the number of children living with a single parent and
the number of children living below the poverty line increased
throughout the 1970s, policy maker’s attention grew towards what
were considered inadequate child support payments. When the
US Census Bureau released its first report on child support and
6 Rogers and Bieniewicz (2004), pp. 60–63. See also American Law Institute
(2002), pp. 423–437. Garrison (1998) provides a detailed review of US guideline
history.
7 Most guideline legislation also addressed the enforcement of payments.
8 Both of the major guideline systems in the US have less objectionable divorce
incentives than the Canadian system. See Allen (2007).
alimony in 1980, many were shocked to find out that only 41% of
children under twenty-one, who had a father living elsewhere had
a child support award.9 Worse, about 25% of those with an award
received nothing, and another 25% received less than the award. As
the concepts of a “dead-beat dad” and “feminized poverty” began to
enter the popular nomenclature, and as concerns over rising AFDC
payment developed, policy makers focused on how child support
payments could be made more adequate.10
Beginning in the mid-1970s the US federal government started
to pass various laws to assist specific state departments in enforc-
ing support payments, finding payers, and establishing support
awards. Although several states had voluntarily initiated their own
support guidelines, the federal government required all states to
have some type of numeric guideline in place by the end of 1987.11
The Family Support Act of 1988 made these guidelines a “rebutable
presumption,” meaning that alterations must be justified before a
court.12
All guideline systems have common characteristics when com-
pared to court awards based on the needs of the child. First, when
awards were made in terms of the “needs of child” doctrine, child
support amounts were not automatically adjusted when the par-
ent’s income changed.13 In contrast, all guidelines assume that child
costs are a function of parental income, and as a result, all child
support amounts change (in some way) with changes in parental
income. This means that all guidelines assume that child related
expenses are an exogenous function of income. Second, all guide-
lines fail to account for the utility generated by custody of children
by assuming children are only a cost to the custodial household —
a drain on welfare because children require feeding, clothing, et
cetera, and because they impede remarriage and participation in
the labor force.
As a result of these two  features, support awards under guide-
lines are higher than under the older system. Beller and Graham,
for example, find that monthly awards were higher by $228 in
states with guidelines after accounting for socioeconomic charac-
teristics of women.14 They conclude that on average the guidelines
have had the effect of “increasing the value of awards among the
ever-married” population,15 and that the previous court assigned
awards were “low by any reasonable standards.”16 In addition to
this, guidelines and enforcement legislation have increased the
receipt rate for awards and the government spending on enforce-
ment. Overall, the custodial parent received more dollars with the
introduction of guidelines.
However, not all guideline systems are exactly the same, and
over the time period we  consider, there were four types of child
support systems. Prior to guidelines, support awards were deter-
mined by a court according to a discretionary standard based on
the needs of the child and the ability of the non-custodial parent
to pay. We  will call these older court awards the “needs of child”
9 Census Bureau (1980).
10 Their efforts were supported by the famous Weitzman (1985) study that, based
on  a small non-random sample of Los Angeles divorces, claimed ex-husbands sub-
stantially increased their welfare in the first year post-divorce, while ex-wives
experienced a severe reduction. The actual percentages were a 73% fall for divorced
wives, and a 43% increase for ex-husbands. Though widely cited for over a decade,
they have been largely discredited. For example, see Peterson (1996).
11 Illinois and Maine introduced the first voluntary guidelines in 1975.
12 Beller and Graham (1993), p. 5.
13 This is not to say that awards were fixed in stone. Substantial changes in incomes
(up or down) could result in a (costly) hearing brought by the spouse wanting to
change the amount.
14 Beller and Graham (1993), p. 193. They conclude “Thus, guidelines appear to
work as one would hope for the divorced and separated mother. . .”.
15 Beller and Graham (1993), p. 162. Using data up to the mid-1980s they show
that overall guidelines increase the amount of average support by $260 (p. 194).
16 Beller and Graham (1993), p. 164.
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Table 1
State classifications.
State Year enacted Year changed State Year enacted Year changed
Percentage obligor income
Alaska 1987 Nevada 1987 2002a
Arkansas 1989 North Dakota 1991 2003a
Georgia 1989 2005 (IS) Tennessee 1987 2006 (IS)
Illinois 1986 Texas 1989 2007b
Minnesota 1983 2005 (IS) Wisconsin 1987 2004 (IS)
Mississippi 1989
Income shares
Alabama 1987 Nebraska 1987
Arizona 1987 New Hampshire 1988
California 1992 New Jersey 1986
Colorado 1985 New Mexico 1989
Connecticut 1989 North Carolina 1989
Florida 1987 Ohio 1989
Idaho 1989 Oklahoma 1988
Indiana 1989 Oregon 1989
Iowa  1989 Pennsylvania 1988
Kansas 1987 Rhode Island 1988
Kentucky 1990 South Carolina 1989
Louisiana 1993 South Dakota 1989
Maine  1989 Utah 1989
Maryland 1989 Vermont 1985
Michigan 1986 Virginia 1988
Missouri 1989 Washington 1988
Montana 1989 1998 (M) Wyoming 1988
Melson
Delaware 1990 Massachusetts 1986
DC  1990 New York 1989
Hawaii 1986 West Virginia 1989 2001 (IS)
a These states converted to a model where child costs decline with NC income.
b Ceiling placed on support payment.
doctrine. Once guidelines were introduced, states generally chose
one of three different types. Table 1 provides a list of each state, the
type of guideline, the date implemented, and whether or not the
guideline has changed.
The first type of guideline is called the “percent obligor” (PO),
“percentage of income,” or “Wisconsin” model. In this system
the child support amounts generally depend on just two fac-
tors: the number of children and the non-custodial income.17 The
amount of child support is simply a legislated fraction of the non-
custodial income for a given number of children. The fraction always
increases with the number of children, but (usually) remains con-
stant with respect to income depending on the state. The PO model
was originally designed to recover AFDC payments for low income
custodial mothers, and was never intended for widespread use.18
From Table 1 we see that there were eleven states that started with
a PO model.19 Of these states, four have switched to the second
major child support system: the “income shares” (IS) model.20
17 Income may  be gross or net of some expenses, depending on the state.
18 See Institute for Research on Poverty (1982), pp. 143–144, for a nice history
of  the PO systems. Given the low income of the intended obligors, it was  never
considered a problem to use gross income in the calculation of child support. Given
that the custodial recipient was often on AFDC, the original Wisconsin guidelines
assumed that custodial income was zero. When states hurriedly adopted this form
of  guideline, these features were adopted at the same time.
19 The attraction of this type of guideline was its simplicity. However, this type of
guideline was not recommended by the federal government. One report stated:
The Wisconsin standard is designed to act like an income tax. With only two pri-
mary parameters, gross income and number of children, the Wisconsin standard
is  intended to be applied automatically by employers under a statewide holding
system. However, the administrative benefit of simplicity may  be obtained at
the  price of loss of equity because it does not provide treatment for certain key
factor (e.g. custodial parent income, child care expenses). Because the Wiscon-
sin standard is designed as a constant percentage of gross income, it also has
the effect of setting orders as an increasing percentage of net income as obligor
income rises. This effect is contrary to the economic evidence on actual child
rearing expenditures. [US, 1987, pp. II–126]
20 All of these switches occurred after 2002, and are therefore, irrelevant to our
empirical work.
Under the IS system child support payments depend on the
relative incomes of both spouses, and possibly other factors. The
combined income is multiplied by some percentage to determine
the total child support award. Each parent’s award obligation is
based on their fraction of total income. The custodial parent is
assumed to make an equivalent cash payment in terms of the care
given within the household, and the non-custodial parent makes a
cash payment to the ex-spouse. Most states are of the income share
type. The third type of support system is called the “Melson” model
or the “Delaware–Melson” model, after the Delaware state judge
Elwood Melson who developed it. The Melson model is basically
an income share system, but allows for a reserve level of income to
be removed from the total level of income to be divided in order to
provide each spouse with some minimal level of income for basic
needs.
A major difference between the two  major systems is their built
in assumptions regarding the relationship between child costs and
parental income. Until very recently, all but one PO state had linear
cost functions for children. For example, in Alaska the state still
determines the child support award as 20% of the non-custodial
income for one child, 27% for two  children, 33% for three children, et
cetera. There is no cap on child support awards, so the percentage of
income is constant across low and high income levels. On  the other
hand, thirty of the thirty four IS states have cost functions where
average child costs fall with increases in income.21
Finally, under US tax law, there are often considerable advan-
tages to custodial households in obligor states. Because the
custodial parent is the head of a household, that parent is able
to claim a larger standardized deduction.22 The custodial parent,
21 Beller and Graham (1993), p. 200. For example, in Arizona child costs are
assumed to be 23.8% if monthly joint income is $700 month, but this falls to 20.2%
if  monthly income is $2500 per month.
22 Of course, this is only an advantage if the custodial income is high enough.
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barring a private agreement, is likely the only one who can claim
dependent exemptions, and custodial parents are the only ones eli-
gible for child tax credits, such as children’s tax exemptions, earned
income tax credits, and dependent care tax credits. Since child sup-
port payments in obligor states are often based on gross income of
the non-custodial parent, these differences can make a large dif-
ference in after tax income across the households. This does not
hold for Income Share states where support payments are based
on intact total family incomes.23
3. Transfers of wealth
3.1. Guidelines vs court awards
In the case of guidelines vs court awards, we have already noted
the increase in dollar awards that arose with the introduction of
guidelines. However, it is important to emphasize the additional
transfer of wealth that results from the assumption that children
do not create value. Children are often the most valuable family
asset, and much of the utility that arises over children does not
come from simple procreation, but from contact and involvement
on a day-to-day basis. It is the relationship between parent and
child that is often the most valuable attribute of parenthood. The
relationship is not a public good in the dissolving marriage, and is
not the same as simple procreation.
Despite the obvious value of parenthood, all guideline systems
ignore it when calculating support payments. Not counting custody
as a gain in the calculation of child support means that guidelines
will tend to “double count” the award for custody.24 The custodial
parent will get the utility from custody, plus a relatively high cash
transfer to fund the child expenses. It is similar to one side retain-
ing ownership over the family car, while the other side continues
paying for the fuel and maintenance without hope of recouping on
resale.25
All guideline systems assume that child costs are an exoge-
nous function of income. But, of course, child related expenses are
endogenous and determined by the custodial parent. Under both
the PO and IS systems of guidelines, cash transfers only flow from
the non-custodial household in cases where there is full custody
in one parent. The guidelines presume that the custodial house-
hold makes the relevant payment directly in the form of goods
and services provided to the child. This means that for every dol-
lar of extra income earned by the non-custodial parent, a fraction
necessarily goes towards the custodial household, presumably for
child related expenses. The custodial parent, however, unilater-
ally decides how to spend this money, along with any of their
own earned income. Neither system of guideline monitors how
custodial income is spent.26 Thus, the custodial parent is free to
choose how increased income is spent and may  choose to substi-
tute expenditures away from the child and more towards private
consumption as income increases. The freedom to spend custodial
income, especially as the award increases beyond the costs of chil-
dren, is an advantage of the guideline system over the “needs of
child” doctrine, for the custodial household.
23 Rogers (1999), p. 144.
24 “Double counting” is a phrase often used by non-custodial parent rights groups
to  get at what they believe is an over payment.
25 This explains why court awards appear so low. These low awards reflected the
court’s awareness that the custodial parent obtained custody over one of the most
valuable assets of the marriage: the children. Perhaps the main complaint of non-
custodial parents under the guideline system is the lack of contact they have with
their children.
26 Weiss and Willis (1985).
3.2. Income Shares vs percentage of obligor income
Within the policy literature IS and PO guidelines are often pre-
sented as equivalent. This is often done by some type of simple
arithmetic exercise. For example, assume that q is the fraction of
non-custodial income paid as child support in a PO state, and s is
the fraction of total income assumed to be the costs of children in
an IS state. Assuming the wife is the custodial parent, let Mh be the
husband’s income, Mw be the wife’s income, and M be their joint
income. In the PO state the wife receives qMh from the husband for
child support. In the IS state the wife receives (Mh/M) × s × M, or
sMh. If s = q, then the two awards amount in the same payment.27 If
they make the same payment, then there should be no difference
in divorce behavior between the two different regimes.
This exercise showing the presumed equivalence of the IS and
PO systems does not hold in practice for several reasons: their con-
struction; tax treatments; and Engle’s Law. In particular, the above
calculation assumed that the cost of children is a fixed constant frac-
tion of total family income. It has been well known for some time
that this is not the case.28 As family income increases, expendi-
tures on children increase, but the fraction of expenditures to total
income falls.29
When this is the case, the obligor model subsidizes non-child
related expenses in the custodial household. If the child costs, as a
fraction of total income, fall with increases in income, then it is nec-
essary to use the total family income to calculate child costs, and not
just the non-custodial income. Of course, the PO guidelines do not
do this. Thus, PO states will end up penalizing households where
one member earns a significant income.30 To the extent average
child costs are falling with respect to income, the flat rates used
in PO states means there is a net transfer of wealth to the custo-
dial household. This transfer amounts to a form of hidden spousal
support.31
27 For example, consider two households that experience a divorce, with the only
difference being the custodial income between the two families. In one case the non-
custodial parent earns $60,000 per year and the custodial parent earns nothing. In
the other case, each earns $60,000, and in both cases child costs are assumed to
be 25% of income. In the first case the non-custodial parent pays $15,000 in child
support regardless of whether residence is in a PO or IS state since the child support
is  . 25 × 60, 000. In the second case the total child costs are $30,000 and split 50/50,
and  so the non-custodial child support amount in the IS state is also $15,000. In this
second case, had the couple lived in a PO state, the child support payment would
still have been $15,000. Hence, the non-custodial parent pays the same support in
all  cases. The higher incomes in the second household imply an off-setting higher
cost  of children, and this results in the same payment.
28 See Houthakker (1957) or Donaldson and Pendakur (2002). The estimates made
by Donaldson and Pendakur (2002) are complicated, but they find:
.  . . that equivalence scales for households with children decrease significantly
with expenditure. For example, the GESE-restricted equivalence scale for dual
parents with one child is 1.93 at low expenditure and 1.62 at high expenditure.
[p.  4, 2002]
What this means is the equivalence income function does not go through the ori-
gin and may not be linear. They find that for two  children living in a single parent
household the equivalence scale falls dramatically (their estimated point elasticity
is  −0.40 (Table 3, p. 22)).
29 In the example above, suppose that when each parent earns $60,000 the child
costs are 20% of total income rather than 25%, or $24,000. Now the non-custodial
share would be $12,000 in the income sharing state, but remains at $15,000 in an
obligor state. The custodial parent would end up paying $9,000 in child support
rather than $12,000.
30 For example, consider another family where the non-custodial parent earns
$120,000 and the custodial parent earns nothing. Assuming that the PO state deter-
mines child support based on a flat 25% of income and the IS state assumes that
at  this income level the child support award falls to 20% of income, then in the PO
state the non-custodial parent pays $30,000 in support while in the IS state the
non-custodial parent would only pay $24,000.
31 Obligor models of child support have one other non-pecuniary advantage for
custodial parents: freedom from income monitoring. Since child support awards are
not  a function of their incomes, the non-custodial parent has no financial interest in
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Table 2
Divorce incentives.
Custodial parent Non-custodial parent
Needs of child Small Large (if dead-beat)
Small (if involved)
Income Shares (IS) Small Small
Percent obligor’s income (PO) Large Small
Rogers, in assessing differences between obligor and Income
Shares states claims that obligor states:
. . . transfer income from non-custodial parents to custodial par-
ents in a manner that results in the custodial parent having a
significantly higher standard of living than the non-custodial
parent in most income situations involving from one through
five children. The custodial parent generally ends up with a
higher standard of living than the non-custodial parent on an
after-tax, after-child support basis. [p. 139, 1999]
Rogers and Bieniewicz (2004) extensively examine relative
standards of living for custodial and non-custodial households
under PO and IS systems. They systematically find that PO schemes
transfer more income to the custodial home, especially for high
income levels.
With Wisconsin-style, gross income basis guidelines, as
reported in table 5a.9 for situations in which the custodial par-
ent has 50, 70 or 100% of the non-custodial parent’s income, the
former ends up with a dramatically higher standard of living
that the non-custodial parent. And when the custodial parent
has a higher gross income, the custodial parent’s standard of
living advantage is boosted even further. [p. 79, 2004]
4. Incentives to divorce
The various wealth transfers caused by guidelines can be sum-
marized in Table 2. When child support awards were given under
the “needs of child” doctrine, the custodial parent had a reduced
incentive to leave on the basis of the low child support award.
Although the custodial parent gained utility through custody, this
came at a cost since the courts implicitly recognized the utility
gain and the child support awards were small. For the average,
“involved,” non-custodial parent, the incentive to divorce under
“needs of child” were also small. Payments would be low, but
there is a loss of utility over custody. Interestingly, for those non-
custodial parents not interested in parenthood (e.g. the dead-beat
dad), such “needs of child” awards would have encouraged aban-
donment of the family, since they would only be concerned with the
reduced payments. Income Share awards create minimal incentives
for either party to leave. Given their design, the custodial parent
does not receive a significant net transfer of wealth because (i) their
income is included in the calculation of the award, and (ii) most IS
states assume that child costs decline with total family income.
Hence the custodial parent may  gain custody, but the cash award
likely just covers the cost of the child. On the other hand, the non-
custodial parent loses any utility from custody and the dead-beat
dad, as well as the involved parent, must pay a larger child support
award. As a result, the non-custodial parent in an IS state also has
no strong incentive to divorce. With the percent of obligor income
(PO) model, however, the divorce incentives are the opposite of
the “needs of child” case. Now the custodial parent has a strong
making sure the income is reported honestly. On the contrary, the custodial parent
has a strong incentive to monitor non-custodial parent income changes closely in
obligor states. This may  or may  not bring utility to the custodial parent, but it is
certainly a matter of disutility for the non-custodial parent.
incentive to divorce since all factors designed into the guidelines
create a transfer of wealth: they obtain custody and a cash award
that over compensates for costs, especially for high incomes.32 The
non-custodial parent in this case is less interested in divorce since
the payments are high and the utility over custody is lost.33
This simple framework guides our empirical work. We  expect
to observe the following:
1. The switch from “needs of child” awards to PO awards should
increase divorce rates.
2. With the transition to a PO state, divorce rates should be higher
in families where the non-custodial parent’s pre-divorce income
increases.
3. With the transition to a PO state, divorce rates should be unaf-
fected by the level of the custodial parent’s pre-divorce income.
4. The switch from “needs of child” awards to IS awards should
have lowered divorce rates.
5. With the transition to an IS state, divorce rates should be unaf-
fected by the level of either parent’s income.
6. When couples have no children, the probability of divorce should
be unaffected by the type of child support law.
7. Couples with children living in states that determine child sup-
port based on a flat percentage of non-custodial income (PO
states), should be more likely to divorce than similar couples
in IS states.
5. NLSY 1979 data and results
Data to test our predictions come from the 1979 National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). This panel begins in 1979 and
follows 12,686 men  and women  who  were between the ages 14
and 22 in 1979. Individuals were interviewed annually until 1994,
and biennially since then. We  follow them until 2002, which means
our panel starts before most states adopt a guideline, and carries
on until just before some of the obligor states start changing the
structure of their guidelines to come closer to Income Share states.
Although the NLSY is mostly concerned with labor market partici-
pation, it does track the marital histories of individuals. It does not
keep adequate track of child support payments or custody. As a
result, we assume that the wife always obtains custody.34 One nice
feature of the NLSY for our study is that individuals enter the data
very young, and few of them are married in 1979. This minimizes
a censoring problem. From the NLSY we extracted a panel of first
time married individuals. Thus, a person enters our panel the year
they first marry, and they remain in the panel until they divorce or
32 The Canadian situation points to an extreme example. Designed after early ver-
sions of the Wisconsin PO model, the Canadian guidelines use a linear equivalence
scale that greatly over estimates the cots of children, assumes children spend no
time with the non-custodial parent, and requires the non-custodial parent to sub-
sidize extra expenses, such as sports equipment and piano lessons. The result is a
very strong incentive for custodial parents to divorce after non-custodial incomes
of  $60,000. See Allen (2007).
33 If there were no costs to negotiate different splits within an efficient marriage,
then none of these different guidelines would have made any difference. PO states
would just mean an increase in wealth within the marriage to the potential custodial
parent. However, transaction costs are positive in marriage and divorce, and as a
result the rules matter.
34 Brinig and Allen, 2000 Spring find that this is true between 70 and 80% of the
time, and so some measurement error is introduced. If this error is uncorrelated with
spouse income, then the effect is simply to increase our standard errors. However,
if  the measurement error is correlated with spouse income, it will bias our results.
It  is difficult to find data to actually measure this correlation. Fortunately, in an
earlier study (Allen & Brinig, 2011) we found that the level of both husband and
wife  education is unrelated to the success of gaining custody. Since education levels
are  highly correlated with income, we are confident that this measurement error is
not  introducing bias.




Years married = the number of years married.
Years married squared = years married × years married.
Controls
Year = reference year of survey.
Age = age of respondent.
Age squared = age × age.
Spouse education = highest grade completed by respondent’s spouse.
Education = highest grade completed by respondent.a
Number of children = number of children dependent on respondent.
Two parents = 1 if respondents parents were still married in 1979
ESL  = 1 if English was  a second language for respondent in 1979.
Black = 1 if respondent is black.
Catholic = 1 if respondent was  Catholic in 1979.
Baptist = 1 if respondent was  Baptist in 1979.
Mainstream = 1 if respondent belonged to mainstream denomination in
1979.
No religion = 1 if respondent identified with no religion in 1979.
Gross income = 1 if gross income was used to calculate payment.
Shared parent offset = 1 if support payments were reduced when parenting
shared.
Non-custodial income = total before-tax income of husband (in $10,000s).
Custodial income = total before-tax income of wife (in $10,000s).
Test variables
Obligor state = 1 if state uses % of obligator income guidelines.
NC income × obligor = interaction term.
Custodial income × obligor = interaction term.
Income Share = 1 if state uses Income Share guidelines.
a Contains significant measurement error, see text for elaboration.
reach 2002.35 We  estimate the effect of many covariates (listed in
Table 3) on the probability of divorce using discrete time varying
logit regressions.36 This methodology provides an estimate of the
divorce effect conditional on being married for a given length of
time.37
Table 4 presents evidence for our first five predictions. Each
regression in Table 4 shows the results of a discrete time logit
regression examining the probability of divorce before and after
the switch from “needs of child” to some type of guideline.38 Each
regression column lists the test variables we are interested in first,
and then the control variables follow.39 The dependent variable in
each regression is 1 if the individual divorced in the reference year,
and 0 otherwise. Eqs. (1) and (2) include only states that switched
to obligor regimes, while Eqs. (3) and (4) include only states that
switched to Income Shares.
35 Of course, there is an attrition to the sample as well from individuals who  drop
out of the NLSY.
36 In our first set of regressions found in Table 4 we  report the coefficients for all of
the  controls listed in Table 3. Generally these results confirm some well known
findings. Divorce probabilities rise and then fall with the age of the individual;
education levels and income have negative effects on divorce probabilities; and
being Catholic compared to no religious affiliation has a small but negative effect on
divorce probabilities.
37 Because we  use individual data, but are interested in a clustered (i.e. state level)
covariate (i.e. whether or not a state has a particular guideline), we estimate using
clustered robust standard errors. This allows for non-zero correlations between the
error terms within the aggregate covariate. The effect of this is to considerably
increase the size of our standard errors.
38 To simplify presentation, for our empirical work we combine Melson and Income
Share states. Empirically we cannot distinguish the two, and the results are almost
identical whether they are grouped together or not. This also means we  do not need
to  worry about Montana’s switch to a Melson system in 1998, nor West Virginia’s
switch to Income Shares in 2001. We also split the sample and compare the transition
from  “needs of the child” to PO states, and “needs of the child” to IS states. We do this
because there are several differences between the different child support guidelines
that  would not be captured using simple dummy  variables.
39 Although not reported, we  also ran these regressions using state fixed effects
with little difference in the results. That is, the signs and significance levels remained
similar.
Table 4
Discrete time logistic regressions on NLSY data.
Obligor Income Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test variables
Obligor state 0.47 −0.73
(2.03) (− 1.46)
Custodial income × Obligor −0.10
(− 0.40)
NC income × Obligor 0.43
(4.67)
Income Share state −0.46 −1.74
(− 3.31) (− 4.23)
Custodial income × Income Share −0.19
(− 1.64)
NC income × Income Share −0.07
(− 0.48)
Controls:
Custodial income −0.08 −0.004 0.004 0.009
(− 0.37) (− 0.03) (0.14) (3.26)
NC  income −0.12 −0.48 −0.32 −0.31
(− 1.53) (− 5.64) (− 1.28) (− 3.01)
Year 0.04 0.68 0.09 0.10
(1.01) (1.52) (3.24) (2.28)
Age  0.08 0.17 0.35 0.51
(0.04) (0.88) (5.03) (2.71)
Age  squared −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(− 0.32) (− 0.80) (− 5.10) (− 2.91)
Years married −0.05 −0.05 0.04 −0.45
(− 0.73) (− 0.60) (1.86) (− 0.86)
Years married Sq. 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(0.30) (0.22) (− 3.64) (− 0.64)
Spouse Educ. −0.11 −0.10 −0.08 −0.06
(− 7.02) (− 6.08) (− 5.91) (− 3.19)
Education −0.02 −0.13 −0.14 −0.26
(− 0.38) (− 0.31) (− 0.48) (− 0.77)
#  of children −0.08 −0.08 0.17 0.00
(− 0.59) (− 0.63) (2.25) (0.02)
Two parents −0.24 −0.23 −0.34 −0.31
(− 0.82) (− 0.79) (− 5.46) (− 2.39)
ESL −0.54 −0.52 −0.77 −0.11
(− 1.67) (− 1.65) (− 0.89) (− 0.50)
Catholic −0.17 −0.16 −0.06 −0.73
(− 0.47) (− 0.45) (− 0.55) (− 0.41)
Baptist 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.23
(0.61) (0.63) (3.36) (1.54)
Maninstream 0.20 0.19 −0.02 −0.16
(0.61) (0.58) (− 0.15) (− 0.80)
No religion 0.84 0.81 0.21 0.42
(1.70) (1.69) (1.67) (1.96)
Constant −98.19 −142.7 −186.7 −213.6
(− 1.08) (− 1.62) (− 3.36) (− 2.38)
2 566.5 801.9 804.9 657.6
(df)  (17) (19) (17) (19)
N  14,882 14,882 35,168 35,168
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.054 0.054 0.044 0.044
Guidelines vs court “Needs of Child” awards.
Dependent variable = 1 if divorced in reference year.
t-Statistics in parentheses.
Eq. (1) in Table 4 shows that moving from “needs of child” to
percentage of non-custodial income (PO) guidelines significantly
increased the divorce probability (Prediction 1). That is, the coef-
ficient for obligor state is positive and significant. Eq. (2) fine
tunes this estimate by including the two  income interactive terms.
Interacting the PO variable with both custodial and non-custodial
income shows that for PO states the increase in divorce is the result
of increases in non-custodial income. Changes to the custodial
income make no difference to the divorce probability, but increases
to the non-custodial income have a significant impact, as we expect,
since custodial income makes no difference to the amount of the
transfer (Predictions 2, 3). When the income interaction terms are
included, the PO dummy  variable is no longer positive or significant.
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Eqs. (3) and (4) in Table 4 shows that the opposite effect happens
in states that switch to Income Shares from “Needs of Child” child
support. These states experienced a reduction in divorce rates (Pre-
diction 4), and this result holds up even when parent incomes are
interacted with the legal term. Neither of the income interaction
terms is significant, reflecting the lack of incentive to divorce the
Income Share system creates with changes in income (Prediction
5). The striking results from regressions (1) to (4) in Table 4 test five
different predictions, and they show one fundamental policy flaw:
the PO guidelines are destabilizing for families where the potential
non-custodial income is high.
Returning to Eq. (2) in Table 4 we see that increases in non-
custodial income are stabilizing to a marriage (the coefficient being
−0.48): however, this stabilizing effect is almost completely off-
set by the non-custodial interactive term (0.43). This is not the
case in Income Share states. Non-custodial income is stabilizing
in these states (−0.31, from Eq. (4)), and this is reinforced by the
Income Share child support rule (−0.07), although this latter effect
is statistically insignificant.40
Hence, the PO system of child support takes something that is good
for children (income), and makes it work against the interests of
the child (through divorce).
Table 5 presents the results of four other discrete time logis-
tic regressions using different samples of individuals to provide
some additional support for Table 4. The dependent variable again
equals 1 if the couple separated in the reference year, and is zero if
they remained married. Regressions (1) and (2) use the sample of
married couples without children as a falsification test. For these
couples the child support guidelines are irrelevant for divorce con-
siderations (prediction 6). As the results from regressions (1) and
(2) show, divorce probabilities are not a function of either custo-
dial or non-custodial incomes in this sample. Furthermore, childless
couples in obligor states do not have higher divorce rates compared
to couples in other types of states. The regressions from Eqs. (1)
and (2) in both Tables 4 and 5 provide evidence that the obligor
guidelines increased the divorce probability for a particular type of
family: those with children and high primary income earners.
The last two regressions in Table 5 use observations prior to the
imposition of child support guidelines in 1988 as a sensitivity test
with respect to how a state came to adopt its guideline rule. Only
those states that voluntarily imposed child support guidelines have
them during this period. States which adopt obligor type guide-
lines may, for some reason, have families that are more susceptible
to divorce when non-custodial incomes increase. Given that some
states adopted guidelines on their own prior to 1988, and others had
them imposed on them by the federal government, we  can look at
the effect of obligor status on a subsample. Regressions (3) and (4)
in Table 5 show the results when the sample is restricted to years
prior to 1988. As can be seen, the general result still stands: divorce
probabilities increase in non-custodial income and are unrelated to
custodial income.41 These regressions suggest that the route to a
PO system is not important.42
40 The marginal effects of the test variables for Eqs. (2) and (4) are:
Eq. (2) Eq. (4)
Test variables Marginal effects Test variables Marginal effects
Obligor state −0.003 Income Share state −0.0121
Custodial income × obligor −0.0004 Custodial income × Income Share −0.0008
NC  income × obligor 0.0018 NC income × Income Share 0.0003
41 We do not report the regressions run on post 1988 years, nor the regressions
where we drop the income interaction terms. The results are similar in those regres-
sions to regressions (1) and (2) as well.
42 This also explains why  the inclusion of state fixed effects makes little difference.
Table 5
Discrete time logistic regressions on NLSY data.
No children Prior to 1988
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test variable
Obligor state 0.36 −0.34 0.26 −1.39
(0.73) (− 0.48) (0.35) (− 0.89)
Custodial income × obligor 0.12 0.21
(0.29) (0.90)
NC income × obligor 0.28 0.87
(1.42) (2.29)
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 330.7 338.2 309.5 586.5
(df) (17) (19) (17) (19)
N 4405 4405 7774 7774
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.055 0.055 0.047 0.047
Guidelines vs court “Needs of Child” awards.
Dependent variable = 1 if divorced in reference year.
t-Statistics in parentheses.
Table 6
Discrete time logistic regressions on NLSY data.
(1) (2) (3)
Test variable
Obligor state 0.52 0.57 0.35
(8.49) (3.32) (1.16)
Custodial income −0.02 −0.017
(− 0.68) (− 0.36)
NC income −0.01 −0.05
(− 3.44) (− 0.80)
Custodial income × obligor −0.02
(− 0.15)
NC income × obligor 0.07
(1.15)
Controls: Yes Yes Yes
2 1187.4 459.5 415.2
(df) (18) (20) (22)
N  45,459 39,656 39,656
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.049 0.047 0.047
Obligor vs other support awards.
Dependent variable = 1 if divorced in reference year.
t-Statistics in parentheses.
Finally, Table 6 shows the results from three regressions to see
if there is a significant difference between PO and IS states (Predic-
tion 7).43 Looking at the unconditional divorce rate averages, PO
states have higher divorce rates: 5.4% vs 4.4%. Eq. (1) in Table 6
shows a strong positive coefficient for OBLIGOR, which implies a
higher divorce rate, controlling for most of our other variables.
However, when we add in the income interaction terms, this coef-
ficient remains positive, but becomes insignificant.
43 These regressions include three extra explanatory variables: Gross Income, Col-
lege Support, and Shared Parenting Offset. These were used to control for additional
guideline differences across states. The results shown in Table 6 did not differ based
on  whether these variables were in or out of the regression.
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6. Conclusion
Our empirical work provides support for the claim that different
guideline formulas provide different divorce incentives. Families
with a high primary income earner living in a PO state, are more
vulnerable to a divorce compared to a similar family prior to guide-
lines. This relationship is likely to hold compared to an Income
Share system as well. Our results also explain the transition over
time of PO states to IS states found in Table 1. Percentage of obligor
income models were designed to handle very specific marriage
situations. Namely, they were designed for low income welfare
families, where the non-custodial parent was absent and earned
a low income, where the custodial parent had custody 100% of the
time, earned zero income, and where the support award was lim-
ited by the AFDC payment. With the exception of Minnesota, all
of the other states which adopted this type of guideline seem to
have done so in the haste created by the federal mandate to acquire
guidelines. They simply took the existing guidelines being used in
their welfare departments and applied them to all divorce cases
with children. The result was a bad fit for families that did not meet
the low income conditions and subsequent increase in inefficient
divorces. No doubt over time the state legislatures have learned the
poor incentive effects of the PO system and have started to correct
the problem.
Our results also have a subtle implication for no-fault divorce
studies in general. There are many studies on the effect of no-fault
divorce laws on divorce rates, and the latest conclusions are that
no-fault divorce laws increased divorce rates only temporarily —
for periods of ten to fifteen years.44 The recent studies tend to use
aggregate state wide data, controlling for state and year effects with
dummy  variables. A common interpretation of these results is that
married couples and couples intending to marry learn to antici-
pate the effects of these laws and adjust their behavior accordingly.
Hence divorce rates fall back to trend over time. However, this
conclusion may not be warranted.
The reason for the proviso is that aggregate data may  not be
well suited for testing the effect of various no-fault laws on divorce
rates. As shown by the NLSY results, the different guideline laws
influence families differently depending on whether or not chil-
dren are present and what the distribution and level of income is
between the spouses. These differences cannot be captured by a
state fixed effect term. Across a given state different family types
will tend to “wash out” and may  not show up in aggregate statistics.
No-fault divorce, by itself, is unlikely to have a significant effect
on its own since it only allows the opportunity to leave without
a mutual agreement. No-fault divorce, combined with exploitable
property/support laws, on the other hand, should have a large bear-
ing on divorce rates. To create an incentive to inefficiently divorce
requires both the opportunity and the willingness of one party to
divorce. Simply looking at whether a state has no fault laws is, in
principle, inadequate. The amazing coincidence for most no fault
studies has been that, in practice, most states had combinations of
family laws that generally created incentives to divorce across all
family types, and therefore, positive correlations were found. How-
ever, over time legislation is enacted governing property, custody,
and support, which reduces the willingness of any party to oppor-
tunistically divorce. This legislative effect can also explain the short
run effects of no-fault divorce rates.
In general, to study the effect of no-fault divorce laws on
divorce rates one must consider the entire marital law regime
44 The first to find this result was Wolfers (2006).  Matouschek and Rasul (2008)
also  find a large but temporary effect.
surrounding the divorce decision. Within the context of this paper,
an improperly designed child support guideline that creates an
opportunity to transfer wealth through divorce actually increased
some divorce rates substantially. Other laws which mitigate wealth
transfers can lower divorce rates. Thus, reductions in divorce rates
over time may  simply be the result of well designed net wealth
transferring laws which occurred over time. They may  also be
the result of endogenous changes in spouse matching. Future
divorce research will be more successful in sorting this out if it
recognizes the distinction between the ability and willingness to
divorce.
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